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Since the 1980s, the behavior of institutional investors in the well-developed 
countries gradually changes from Wall Street Rule to Shareholder Activism. The study 
of institutional investors participating in the corporate governance has reached a new 
level. With the advocacy of “Energetically Promoting Institutional Investors” from the 
Security Regulatory Commission in 2001, institutional investors in China undergo ten 
golden years. Investor institutionalization has gradually become a notable feature in 
China. What are the preference and the influence of institutional investors on the 
corporate governance? Are the institutional investors choosing Wall Street Rule, or 
Shareholder Activism? 
This thesis introduces reasons and ways of institutional investors participating in 
corporate governance and analyses internal and external factors which influence 
institutional investors participating in corporate governance. Constructing board 
governance index which is good proxy for corporate governance, this thesis finds that 
level of corporate governance in China is medium and gradually becomes better. 
Based on the panel data, we use OLS and IV method to regress the models, finding 
that total institutional investors and funds choose both Wall Street Rule and 
Shareholder Activism, but other institutional investors choose neither. After that, this 
thesis conducts an in-depth analysis on the reasons why most of institutional investors 
fail to improve the corporate governance and then provides several corresponding 
policy suggestions at the end of the paper.  
This thesis creatively constructs board governance index and has some 
contributions on subdividing institutional investors researching, comparison of OLS 
and IV regression results, expanding time span of the sample and increasing 
dimensionality of control variables. Combining qualitative analysis and quantitative 
analysis, this thesis tries to provide reference to the improvement of corporate 
governance and coordinated development of institutional investors. 
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